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There is no consensus about the causes of the reduction in business cycle volatility seen in 
many major economies over the last decade. Using stylised models of the economies of the 
US, Euro area, UK and Japan, we argue that economic stability has been fostered by 
improved monetary policy and by associated changes in the behaviour of inflation, which has 
itself led to a reduction in the volatility of economic shocks. Assuming an absence of 
cataclysmic events, our projections suggest that most major economies should continue to 
enjoy an unusual degree of stability. 
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Introduction and summary 
In Britain, it has been referred to as the “nice” decade – ten years of non-inflationary consistent 
expansion. Americans speak instead of the “Great Moderation”. But whatever the designation, the 
phenomenon is much the same. Over the last decade, the Anglo-Saxon economies have enjoyed a 
period of unrivalled stability. Activity has continued to fluctuate but less violently, severe recessions 
have been avoided and inflation has stayed low and stable. The same is true of many other major 
economies, although Japan and Germany have performed relatively badly.  
A burgeoning academic literature, mainly focused on the US experience, has reached a broad 
consensus about these basic facts
1. But there is much less agreement about the causes of improved 
macroeconomic stability (especially the improved stability of output) and whether it will endure.  
Some believe that economies have become naturally more self-stabilising as a result of the shift in 
activity from manufacturing to services or because of better inventory management or the deregulation 
and integration of financial markets
2. Others claim that stability stems from better policy making, 
notably the shift towards central-bank independence and the more effective use of interest rates to 
contain inflation
3. A few think that fiscal policy might have contributed
4. Still others argue that the 
reduction in the volatility of output, though not of inflation, is largely the result of good luck
5.  
Contrasting views about the causes of stability carry over into contrasting beliefs about its likely 
durability. In keeping with their “good luck” interpretation of the reduction in US output volatility, 
Stock and Watson (2002) draw “the unsettling conclusion that the quiescence of the past fifteen years 
could well be a hiatus before a return to more turbulent economic times”. Bernanke (2004), by contrast, 
professes himself “optimistic for the future”, in the belief that monetary policy should continue to act in 
a stabilising fashion. In the UK, the Governor of the Bank of England (King (2003)) occupies a middle 
ground arguing: “it is almost inevitable that there will be somewhat greater volatility of both output and 
inflation than the remarkable stability to which we have become used in recent years.” 
Our paper has four sections. The first summaries key facts about the volatility of business cycles in the 
major economies and globally. Some of the explanations for their recent tranquillity are briefly 
reviewed in the second section. We focus in particular on the role that may have been played by the 
changing behaviour of inflation, a topic only lightly covered by Stock and Watson (2002, 2003b) in 
their otherwise magisterial surveys. In the next section, we perform counterfactual experiments to 
reveal the importance of the underlying causes of greater stability. We extend the typical coverage of 
previous studies that use small macroeconomic models by considering four economic regions – the US, 
the Euro area, the UK and Japan – and develop a new and comprehensive method of accounting for the 
change in volatility. We also shed some light on the forces behind the changing volatility of shocks.  
In the final section, we project the future volatility of economic growth and inflation in the four regions 
and their “global” aggregation under various assumptions about the volatility of shocks, the conduct of 
policy and the long-run steady state of each region. We assess prospects against three criteria: the 
volatility of growth and inflation, the risk of severe recession and the probability of experiencing zero 
nominal short-term interest rates. To our knowledge, this has not been done before. 
We reach these conclusions: 
• 
                                                
Since the Great Inflation of the 1970s, economic stability has been fostered by improved monetary 
policy and by associated changes in the behaviour of inflation, which has become less self-feeding 
 
1 On the US, see, for example, Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004); Blanchard and Simon (2001); Chauvet and 
Potter (2001); Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002); Kim and Nelson (1999); Kim, Nelson and Piger (2003); 
Koop and Potter (2000); McConnell, Mosser and Perez-Quiros (1999); McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000); Stock 
and Watson (2002, 2003b); Warnock and Warnock (2000). The changing volatility of non-U.S. activity is 
examined in Dalsgaard, Elmeskov and Park (2002); Mills and Wang (2000); Smith and Summers (2002); van Dijk, 
Osborn and Sensier (2002). Buch, Döpke and Pierdzioch (2002b); Debs (2001) and Simon (2001) examine the 
causes of changing volatility in, respectively, Germany, Canada and Australia. 
2 See, for example, Dalsgaard, Elmeskov and Park (2002); Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003); McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros (2000). 
3 See, for example, Bernanke (2004); King (2002); Taylor (1998). 
4 Contrast, for example, Auerbach (2002) with the upbeat assessment of HM Treasury (2004). 
5 See, for example, Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004) and Stock and Watson (2002, 2003b). and less responsive to output. Economic shocks have become less volatile for the same reason; the 
scale of “shocks” revealed by econometric methods thus depends on the nature of the policy regime. 
If the experience of the last 20 years is a guide – a period that includes a wide range of sizeable 
economic shocks – we would expect the major economies outside Japan to continue to enjoy 
unusually stable conditions, albeit not as “nice” as the last decade. 
• 
•  A return to 1970s style shocks would disturb all the major regions and materially increase severe 
recession risk. A continuation of stable economic conditions would appear to depend on the presence 
of sound counter-inflation policies and an absence of extreme geopolitical or natural disasters. 
 
A brief history of volatility 
The history of business cycles can be conveniently summarised using a measure of volatility of 
economic growth and inflation. Growth is measured by the annual percentage change in the gross 
domestic product expressed in volume terms; inflation is measured by the annual percentage change in 
the economy-wide measure of prices. Data are taken from authoritative sources. National official 
sources are used for post-World War II US and UK data; otherwise we rely, in addition, on Feinstein 
(1972); Johnston and Williamson (2003); Maddison (2003); Mitchell (1982, 1998) and the OECD 
Economic Outlook database and its updates. We use the sample measure of standard deviation to gauge 
the typical scale of the ups and downs of growth and inflation around their averages. For our purposes, 
only unimportant details and not the broad picture would be affected were we to use other measures of 
volatility, such as the variability of the “output gap” or quarterly rates of growth and inflation.  
Tables 1 and 2 divide the last 50 years into four periods – first, the 20 years from the end of the Korean 
War in the early-1950s to the growth climacteric of 1973, a period often referred to as a “Golden Age”; 
second, the subsequent turbulent decade of large oil price and other shocks until 1983; third, the next 
decade of marked disinflation and, fourth, the benign decade ending in 2003. The choice of 1983 and 
1984 as dividing years is important for a particular reason. Applying sophisticated statistical methods 
to a wide variety of economic measures, a library of research has concluded that stability broke out in 
America precisely 20 years ago. Elsewhere, volatility breaks, estimated using similar techniques, might 
have occurred earlier as well as later, as Table 3 shows.  
The simple estimates in Table 1 suffice to bring out the main changes in the volatility of growth. In the 
US, growth volatility in the last decade was half that of the Golden Age up to 1973, and less than half 
the volatility of the turbulent decade in the 1970s and early-1980s. Large reductions in growth 
volatility are seen in most of the other major economies shown in Table 1. Comparing the last decade 
with the Golden Age, growth volatility has fallen by between 40% and 60% in the major economies 
except France, and all of them are less volatile compared with the decade ending in 1983. The changes 
in inflation volatility are more dramatic still. Compared with the Golden Age (which includes the 
period of sharply rising inflation from the late-1960s onwards), inflation volatility in the major 
economies has fallen by between 60% and 80% in the last decade. 
Table 1: Growth volatility 
%    1954-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 
United  States  2.5 2.8 1.9 1.2 
Germany 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.0 
France  1.2 1.4 1.6 1.2 
Italy  1.5 2.7 1.4 0.9 
United  Kingdom  1.8 2.2 2.0 0.8 
Japan  2.4 1.9 2.0 1.5 
Source: see text. Standard deviations of annual real GDP growth 
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%  1954-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 
United  States  1.6 1.9 0.7 0.4 
Germany  1.9 1.2 1.1 0.8 
France 2.5 1.2 1.6 0.6 
Italy  3.0 2.4 2.2 1.2 
United  Kingdom  2.4 6.0 1.7 0.7 
Japan  2.7 5.4 1.0 0.9 
Source: see text.  Standard deviations of annual GDP price inflation 
 
Table 3: Timing of growth volatility reduction 
Study/economy  Mills & Wang  Smith & Summers  van Dijk, Osborn & Sensier*
United  States  1984 1984 1984 
Canada late-1970s  1992  1984 
Australia  n.a. 1984 n.a. 
Germany  1974  early-1970s, ? after unification 1994** 
France 1979**  n.a.  1989 
Italy  1982 n.a. 1988 
United Kingdom  1993  1982 or 1992  1990 
Japan 1976  1975,1997↑ 1992↑** 
Source: Mills and Wang (2000); Smith and Summers (2002); van Dijk, Osborn and Sensier (2002) * industrial 
production; others refer to GDP.  ↑ volatility increase   ** insignificant. These studies use sophisticated statistical 
procedures (for example, Markov switching models) to estimate volatility break points and their significance. 
In the light of Blanchard and Simon’s (2001) interesting contention that US growth volatility is subject 
to a trend decline, we examined the ten-year trailing standard deviations of growth and inflation of the 
US and 14 other industrial economies and, in each case, tested for the significance of a time trend. The 
test allowed for the fact that adjacent ten-year trailing measures have nine years of observations in 
common. Regressions, run from 1960, included observations on growth and inflation since 1951.  
Of the 15 economies, we found evidence in seven, including the US, Germany and Japan, of a 
declining trend in the volatility of growth. Inflation volatility appears to trend downwards in five 
economies, including France and Spain. In the majority of cases, however, the evidence rejects the idea 
of trend decline in growth or inflation volatility. 
There is an important proviso. Interpretation of the movements in growth volatility shown in Table 1 
needs to make allowance for changes in the average rate of growth. A fall in growth volatility should 
lessen the likelihood of severe recession and lead to longer expansions – but this will only be so if the 
average (or “trend”) rate of growth does not decline at the same time. (The estimates in Table 3 are 
appropriately based on models that can allow for movements in the average growth rate.) 
 
Table 4: Frequency of severe recession 
%  1954-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 
United States  10  40  10  0 
Germany 5  20  10  10 
France 0 10 10 0 
Italy 0  10  10  0 
United Kingdom  0  40  10  0 
Japan  0 10 0 20 
Source: see text.  Number of years when 0 ≥ GDP growth, % of number of years in period 
To illustrate the combined effect of changes in the average rate of growth and in growth volatility, 
Table 4 examines the peacetime history of severe recessions. A severe recession is defined as any year 
in which GDP falls or fails to grow. The table records the number of severe recession years expressed 
as a percentage of the number of years in each period. 
The results show that the Golden Age was largely free of severe recessions measured in this simple 
fashion, though it is salutary to be reminded that US GDP fell in two years (1954 and 1958) despite a 
high trend rate of growth that exceeded 3½% a year. The standard deviation of growth was 2.5%, 
however. With some poetic licence, one could describe zero US growth during this period as an 
infrequent but not rare “1½ standard deviation event”. Severe recessions became far more frequent 
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high growth volatility. By contrast, the last decade has witnessed a decline in the incidence of severe 
recessions in all the major economies except Japan.  
In the US, lower growth volatility combined with an average growth rate since 1994 in excess of 3% a 
year has made zero growth a rare “2½ standard deviation event”. In Europe, the improvement has also 
been marked. Of the 11 European economies in our set of data, five have experienced the same 
incidence of severe recessions compared with the 1954-1973 period, four (including Spain) have a 
better record while two (including Germany) have a worse record.  
Japan is the main exception. Here the benefit of the reduction in growth volatility has been offset by the 
impact of a markedly lower average rate of growth of less than 1½% a year. Japan has experienced two 
years of falling GDP in the last decade and has been close to stagnation on two other occasions. This 
deterioration is also reflected in the sophisticated volatility estimates shown in Table 3. 
Against this background, it would be difficult to interpret the decline in growth volatility seen in the 
last decade as part of a secular improvement across the industrial world. In most cases, there is no 
evidence of a favourable trend over the last 50 years, and in two main economies (Japan and Germany) 
where a trend may exist, a lower average growth rate has led to a higher incidence of severe recession.  
America appears to be different, however, in keeping with the view of Blanchard and Simon (2001). 
The US has experienced a substantial decline in growth volatility, though opinions differ on whether 
the decline was once-and-for-all or part of a trend (see the contrasting views of Stock and Watson 
(2002) and van Dijk, Osborn and Sensier (2002)). In addition, the US has enjoyed a high (and recently 
improving) trend rate of growth, longer periods of expansions and an absence of severe recessions.  
The much longer-term history offered in Table 5 provides another useful perspective. The table covers 
the history of growth volatility during the period of the International Gold Standard, roughly from the 
early-1870s to the outbreak of World War I, the subsequent 40 years of wars, depression and 
reconstruction, and the peacetime period of the last 50 years.  
 
Table 5: Growth volatility – the long view 
%  Gold Standard  Wars & depression ------------------ Peacetime ------------------ 
  1871-1912 1913-1953 1954-2003  1954-1993 1994-2003 
United  States  4.2 7.6 2.3  2.5 1.2 
Germany 2.3 13.4 2.6 2.7  1.0 
France 4.5  12.6  2.0  2.0  1.2 
Italy  4.1 9.2 2.3  2.3 0.9 
United  Kingdom  2.2 4.5 1.9  2.1 0.8 
Japan 5.2  10.2  3.8  3.6  1.5 
Source: see text  Standard deviations of annual real GDP growth 
 
It should go without saying that the quality of the data deteriorates as one reaches further back in time; 
in particular, historians have fiercely debated the accuracy of the US figures (see, for example, the 
exchange between Balke and Gordon (1989) and Romer (1987, 1989)). The pattern of volatility is 
sufficiently widespread, however, that a broad-brush conclusion seems possible. Apart from the 1970s, 
it appears that most economies enjoyed more stability after World War II, an interpretation supported 
by the sophisticated tests performed by Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998). 
 
Table 6: Global growth volatility 
%, simple average  1954-1973  1974-1983  1984-1993  1994-2003 
World  4.3 5.3 4.3 3.0 
of  which:      
15 industrial economies   2.1  2.1  1.8  1.2 
91 other economies  4.7 5.9 4.7 3.3 
of  which:      
Africa  4.7 6.5 4.4 3.7 
Latin  America  3.4 4.9 3.6 3.0 
Asia & Middle East  5.6  5.6  5.8  3.1 
Source: see text  Standard deviations of annual real GDP growth 
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So far, the focus has been on the performance of individual economies but it is also relevant to have 
regard to the performance of industrial and other economies considered collectively. As a guide to 
global patterns over the last 50 years, Table 6 records growth volatilities averaged across 106 
economies, 15 main industrial economies and 91 others, mostly developing and emerging. Data on the 
latter are drawn from Maddison (2003) and the IMF World Economic Outlook database.  
Although statistics of variable quality need to be interpreted with care, two features stand out. Not 
surprisingly, developing and emerging economies are more volatile than industrial economies, a fact 
well documented by Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000). Rather more surprising is the general reduction 
in growth volatility seen in the last decade across all the major global regions. Compared with the 
Golden Age, global growth volatility since 1994 has fallen by 30%. 
These simple across-economy averages, which give equal weight to the volatility of the smallest and 
largest economy, may not be the most useful, however. The performance of multinational companies or 
of internationally diversified equity portfolios, for example, would typically be more closely tied to the 
volatility of the main industrial economies with volatilities weighted by size. 
Table 7 performs this calculation by constructing an industrial world group, the G15, the summation of 
the gross domestic products in constant purchasing-power US dollars of 15 main industrial economies. 
The table compares the variability of GDP growth of the G15 with the simple across-economy average 
given in Table 6. Variability on both measures has been lower in the last decade than in the Golden 
Age. The more striking fact is that the variability of G15 growth has been only two-thirds the size of 
the simple across-economy average in every period shown save the 1970s and early-1980s. 
It is worthwhile exploring in more detail the source of the difference between these two measures of 
industrial world volatility. The difference arises, first, as already noted, from the weights given to 
individual economies’ experience and, second, from the degree to which those experiences are shared. 
This raises the question of the correlation between growth rates. Were growth rates uncorrelated, 
individual economies’ particular experiences would tend to average out, reducing the variability of 
industrial world (G15) growth as a whole. Growth synchronisation would have the opposite effect. The 
fact that the variability of growth of the G15 has remained at two-thirds of the simple across-economy 
average suggests that economies’ growth rates have not become more correlated over time. 
 
Table 7: Industrial world (G15) growth volatility 
%  1954-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 
a)  simple  average  2.1 2.1 1.8 1.2 
b)  group  average  1.4 1.8 1.3 0.8 
M e m o :       
b) as % of a)  68  85  69  67 
Source: see text  Standard deviations of annual real GDP growth 
The same point is made more precisely in Table 8, which divides the variability of G15 growth into 
two parts, one arising from the growth variability of America, Europe and Japan, weighted by size of 
region, the other arising from the degree of regional growth synchronisation. The results show that the 
contribution of synchronisation was no larger in the last decade than in the 1950s and 1960s. Only 
during the 1974-1983 interval did the contribution of synchronisation increase. Other research supports 
this conclusion. Doyle and Faust (2003), for example, find no evidence of a statistically significant 
change in growth correlations from the 1980s to the 1990s, even between members of the Euro area or 
between the US and Canada. 
Table 8: G15 growth variability decomposition 
% 1954-1973  1974-1983  1984-1993  1994-2003 
Group average  1.4  1.8  1.3  0.8 
contribution of:         
individual regions  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.6 
synchronisation 0.3  0.8  0.4  0.3 
Source: see text. Standard deviations of real GDP growth. To calculate the split, G15 growth was recomputed as 
the fixed-weighted sum of growth rates of an “American” region (comprising US, Canada, Australia), Europe and 
Japan. The variance of the G15 growth rate was decomposed into the sum of fix-weighted variance (“individual 
regions”) and covariance (“synchronisation”) terms and the results apportioned to total standard deviation. Sum of 
parts may not equal the total due to rounding error. 
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trade, growing international production, deeper financial market integration – to lead to a dominant, 
global business cycle. Studies have shown that increased trade and capital market integration raise 
growth correlations and some sophisticated analyses reveal an important common component in the 
volatility of growth of the major economies (see, for example, Imbs (2004); Kose and Yi (2002); Kose, 
Otrok and Whiteman (2004)). But the bald facts do not show a rising degree of cycle synchronisation. 
This is not a new puzzle. The years corresponding to the gradual adoption of the International Gold 
Standard between around 1870 and the outbreak of World War I provide another example of 
globalisation, when international trade grew rapidly and labour and capital moved comparatively freely 
between countries. Yet as Bordo and Helbling (2003) document, economies were highly decoupled 
during this period. A repetition of the calculation in Table 8 shows that the contribution of regional 
synchronisation to G15 growth volatility under the Gold Standard was close to zero. Panic (1992) 
argues that countries varied tariff levels during this period to immunise themselves from shocks. 
A number of explanations have been offered to solve the more recent “globalisation puzzle”. Krugman 
(1993), for example, reasons that specialisation fostered by international trade could make economies 
more vulnerable to shocks that affect only their industries and no one else’s. The analysis of Heathcote 
and Perri (2002, 2003) suggests that increased financial market integration might have enabled the US 
to enjoy a technology-driven investment boom in the late-1990s larger than would otherwise have been 
the case, at the expense of investment spending overseas - a form of international “crowding-out”. 
Another explanation is that regions in the 1990s were subject to large specific shocks and surprises – 
the US productivity revival, European monetary union, Japanese debt deflation – that encouraged cycle 
decoupling (see, for example, Helbling and Bayoumi (2003); Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2004); 
Martin (1997)). By contrast, large common shocks, such as the two massive oil price hikes, may have 
promoted a (temporary) synchronisation of growth rates in the 1970s and early-1980s. Stock and 
Watson (2003a) argue that cycle volatility and growth correlations would increase considerably were 
world shocks of the 1970s kind to re-appear. 
Explaining stability 
What, then, explains the outbreak of stability? Suggestions fall into three camps: first, structural 
changes that promote the self-stabilisation of economies; second, changes in the conduct of policy and, 
third, changes in the volatility of shocks that buffet economies. This demarcation is not watertight, of 
course, since both structure and shocks may depend on the policy regime. There is also little agreement 
amongst researchers about the main forces at work. We begin with a brief review of frequently 
suggested structural explanations before turning to more promising lines of inquiry. 
 
Sectoral shifts 
In his 1960 Presidential address to the American Economic Association, Arthur Burns argued that a 
trend decline in US output volatility was in train, partly thanks to the shift away from volatile 
manufacturing towards a more stable service economy. Although seemingly correct about the trend 
decline in volatility, the sectoral-shift explanation of changing volatility does not stand up to scrutiny.  
A simple test, performed, for example, by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), involves the 
recalculation of the volatility of GDP growth holding constant the shares of different industries. Were 
sectoral shifts important, one would expect to find a much smaller fall in the volatility of GDP growth 
calculated with fixed shares than with variable shares. In the US this is not the case because the 
volatility of output fell across the board.  
Stock and Watson (2003b) extend the calculation to other major economies. Table 9 shows that the 
sectoral shift view “works” only in the case of Germany, where the fall in volatility is anyway 
compromised by the decline in trend growth. In Italy and Japan, the calculations go the “wrong” way. 
Although a high proportion of a small fall in growth volatility, the absolute impact in the UK is tiny. 
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%   US Germany  France Italy  UK  Japan 
volatility change  -0.0 -0.2 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 
% of variance change -8 -24 -9  9 -62 12 
Source: Stock and Watson (2003b). First row shows the change in the standard deviation of GDP growth attributed 
to sectoral share changes, comparing 1960-1983 with 1984-1996. Row 2 shows the fall in growth variance due to 
sectoral share shifts as a % of the observed change in growth variance. To aid comparison with other tables here, 
the authors’ results have been recalculated in terms of standard deviations (row 1) and a sign convention changed. 
 
Inventory management 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) argue that the 
improved control of inventories – such as “just-in-time” techniques – fostered stability by enabling US 
companies better to smooth their production in the face of surprise changes in demand. Output 
volatility thus fell, the authors contend, in the face of continuing volatility of sales.  
Again, the facts do not oblige. Several studies have shown that the volatility of sales also fell, possibly 
concurrently with the fall in the volatility of US output (see, for example, Ahmed, Levin and Wilson 
(2004); Herrera and Pesavento (2003); Kim, Nelson and Piger (2003)). Moreover, if inventory control 
were key, one would expect to find a fall in the volatility of output that exceeded any fall in the 
volatility of sales. McCarthy and Zakrajšek (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002) both find against this 
proposition; in particular, the latter show that any disproportionate fall in US output volatility relative 
to sales volatility seen in quarter-to-quarter figures disappears at annual frequencies. Extending the 
analysis to examine the volatility record of seven major economies, Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) 
conclude that “Inventories appear to have little explanatory power”.  
 
Financial market de-regulation 
It is sometimes conjectured that financial market liberalisation may have fostered stability. Abolition of 
credit controls and the de-regulation of the mortgage market, in particular, should have enabled 
consumers better to smooth shocks to their income. But as Blanchard and Simon (2001) argue, de-
regulation has also made it easier for consumers and companies to adjust spending to achieve their 
desired holdings of consumer durables and capital, adding to spending volatility. Pro-cyclical lending 
policies – banks turning the credit tap on in booms and off in recessions – would have the same effect. 
 
Inflation behaviour 
A more promising line of enquiry concerns the changing behaviour of inflation. The rise and fall in 
growth volatility over the last 50 years coincides with a rise and fall in inflation, which may in turn 
have led to changes in the way economies respond to shocks and surprises. Compared with the 1970s, 
inflation appears to have become less self-feeding and less responsive to changes in output. The net 
effect on economic volatility is unclear, however. 
Inflation’s self-feeding tendency – sometimes referred to as its degree of “persistence” - can be 
measured by the size of the coefficient (or sum of coefficients) on past inflation in an inflation 
regression. The smaller the coefficient, the smaller would be the effect of an inflation shock today on 
future inflation. Proper estimation of the persistence phenomenon is difficult and contentious (compare, 
for example, Cogley and Sargent (2001) with Pivetta and Reis (2003)). Nevertheless, many studies, 
most focussed on the US, document a decline in inflation persistence as inflation subsided
6.  
Taylor (2000), for example, estimates that the inflation persistence coefficient in the US declined from 
0.94 to 0.74 comparing the periods 1960 to 1979 with 1982 to 1999. Brainard and Perry (2000) 
estimate that the US coefficient rose from 0.58 in 1965 to 0.80 in 1980, subsequently falling to 0.41 in 
1998. Kim, Nelson and Piger (2003) note “a large drop in persistence” in the US after 1979, with the 
persistence coefficient falling from 0.93 to 0.72. For Canada and the UK respectively, Ravenna (2000) 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000); Batini and Nelson (2001); Benati (2002); Brainard and 
Perry (2000); Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2003); Erceg and Levin (2003); Kim, Nelson and Piger (2003); Ravenna 
(2000); Taylor (2000). 
  7and Batini and Nelson (2001) document large falls in inflation persistence during the 1990s. The 
evidence is not all one way, however. Batini (2002) finds little change in inflation persistence in the 
Euro area, while Levin and Piger (2003) conclude that the persistence of inflation in most industrial 
economies during the 1984-2002 interval was generally low (though Japan was an exception).  
Broadly consistent with this state of play, the second and third columns of Table 10 show our simple 
estimates of inflation persistence in the US, UK and Japan and in the major economies that comprise 
today’s Euro area. Estimates are shown for a high inflation era (specifically, the years 1968 to 1983) 
and a low inflation era (the years since 1984). In the ten economies represented, the average inflation 
rate fell by about two-thirds between these periods. The table records a concurrent fall in inflation 
persistence in each region, which, in line with other evidence, is most marked in the US and UK.  
Table 10: Inflation characteristics 
 inflation  persistence  output  sensitivity 
inflation period  high  low  high  low 
United States  0.94  0.37  0.50  0.19 
Euro area  0.38  0.28  0.59  0.29 
United Kingdom  0.96  0.34  0.73  0.42 
Japan 0.76  0.62  0.30  0.19 
Source: authors’ calculations based on SURE regressions in high (1968-1983) and low (1984-2003) inflation 
periods with inflation a function of lagged inflation and a lagged measure of the output gap (the percentage excess 
of GDP over trend GDP, the latter derived using a Hodrick-Prescott filter). Regressions include trend and intercept 
shifts, emphasised by Coenen and Wieland (2002) and Levin and Piger (2003), and shock dummies in the case of 
the UK and Japan during the high inflation period. The appendix gives more details. 
The cause of the downshift in persistence is much debated. New Keynesian models rely on the 
presence of “menu costs”: it may be administratively costly for firms to amend their prices or for wage 
bargainers to acquire inflation protection. As a result, their reaction to inflation may be subdued when 
inflation is low but become more aggressive when inflation is high, a shift of behaviour predicted by 
Rowthorn (1977) and re-examined by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000). 
A second possibility is that expectations of inflation may have become grounded, thanks to the 
increased credibility of inflation targets and central banks. Erceg and Levin (2003), for example, argue 
that inflation expectations are driven by private agents’ forecasts of the central bank’s inflation target; 
ergo, inflation persistence “varies with the stability and transparency of the monetary policy regime”. 
As Bean (2003) documents, the same forces that might account for the fall in inflation persistence 
could explain the second apparent change in inflation’s behaviour - its more limited response to 
changes in output. This is tantamount to a flattening of the slope of the short-run Phillips curve that 
relates inflation to unemployment. The estimates given in the final two columns of Table 10 reveal 
precisely this tendency, though its true nature is the subject of ongoing debate. The reduced sensitivity 
of inflation to output may be a genuine phenomenon or it may reflect shifts in productive potential 
(compare, for example, Mourougane and Ibaragi (2004) with Staiger, Stock and Watson (2001)). 
A fall in inflation persistence and a flattening of the Phillips curve, both resulting from a regime of low 
inflation and more grounded inflation expectations, should be auspicious for stability. Inflation shocks 
would prove less damaging, easing the problems faced by policy makers who aim to contain inflation 
while also stabilising output. The appendix shows formally how a low inflation regime could lead 
eventually to lower volatility not only of inflation but also of output, by an amount dependent on the 
volatility of shocks, policy preferences and the inflation process itself. 
There is a qualification, however. A flattening of the Phillips curve that occurred for other reasons, 
leaving the degree of inflation persistence unchanged, would not necessarily make policy makers’ job 
any easier. The impact on growth and inflation volatility would depend on the type of shock to which 
the policy maker had to respond. With a flatter Phillips curve, output shocks would have a smaller 
effect on inflation, requiring a more modest interest rate response from the central bank. Growth 
variability could fall. But in the face of a direct inflation shock, the smaller response of inflation to 
output would require a larger interest rate reaction and a larger sacrifice of output. Growth variability 
could rise. These propositions are explained more formally in the appendix. 
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In addition to its impact on inflation, changes in the conduct of economic policy may well have 
affected economic volatility in more direct ways. In particular, the very long-term decline in volatility 
portrayed in Table 5, as well as the periods of extreme turbulence, may be partly attributed to the 
gradual development of macroeconomic policy and policy makers’ long and variable learning curve.  
In the nineteenth century, monetary policy was constricted in countries tied to the Gold Standard (and, 
in effect, to a dominant sterling standard): only by chance were interest rates suited to the needs of the 
domestic economy. Although constrained by the attempts to go back on Gold, monetary policy found a 
more independent voice in the 1920s, for good and ill. The scale of the Great Depression is widely 
attributed to errors from which today’s central bankers have learned. The implementation of effective 
lender of last resort facilities, deposit insurance and financial safety nets are part of that legacy. 
As regards fiscal policy, use of the budget to regulate demand was not even a practical proposition one 
hundred years ago. According to Romer (1999), US taxes and government spending were “so small 
that plausible variations in fiscal policy could neither cause nor dampen significant fluctuations”. After 
World War II, a commitment to full employment and the growth of the welfare state gave rise to 
automatic income and demand stabilisers – changes in cyclically-sensitive tax receipts and welfare 
spending – as well as to more active fiscal policy.  
The latter’s track record is patchy; in the US case, for example, Auerbach (2002) concludes “There is 
little evidence that discretionary fiscal policy has played an important stabilising role in recent 
decades”. The automatic stabilisers may have been more effective. In a study of 20 major economies, 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) find that “.. a one percentage point increase in government spending relative to 
GDP reduces output volatility [standard deviation of GDP growth] by eight basis points”, results that in 
the authors’ view “lend support to the traditional Keynesian view of automatic stabilisers.” In the US, 
Cohen and Follette (1999) note that automatic stabilisers have been “quietly doing their thing”. 
Changes in policy makers’ understanding of the world also help to explain the rise and fall in inflation, 
and the associated volatility, during the last 50 years. In the 1960s and 1970s, US and UK policy 
makers attributed the rise in inflation to the effects of militant workers and soaring commodity prices – 
a “cost-push” view of inflation. Nelson (2004), amongst others, argues that this belief made policy 
makers reluctant to use monetary policy as a counter-inflation tool: demand management was deemed 
to be too blunt and costly an instrument. 
One result was resort to direct controls over prices and incomes. A second was a failure better to 
measure the true degree of spare economic capacity, a problem aggravated by the post-1973 slowdown 
in trend growth. A third was a failure to raise interest rates in an appropriate fashion. In the 1970s, real 
interest rates – nominal rates less inflation – were too low and too unresponsive to inflation. As Taylor 
(1993, 1999) notes, failure to raise interest rates more than proportionately as inflation rose would lead 
to a perverse fall in real interest rates that, in turn, would add to inflationary pressure. The “Taylor 
Rule” thus requires nominal interest rates to move more than in proportion to inflation shocks. 
Most statistical depictions of monetary policy show that policy makers did indeed act perversely during 
the Great Inflation but changed course following the appointment of Paul Volcker as Federal Reserve 
chairman in 1979
7. Volcker’s appointment coincided with the second major oil price shock and 
widespread fears of explosive inflation, events that marked the beginning of a new monetary policy 
regime, in the US and elsewhere, which has gradually evolved. Consistent with this history, the 
majority of response coefficients linking nominal interest rates to inflation shown in Table 11 moves 
from well below unity in the period of high inflation to above unity subsequently. 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Boivin and Giannoni (2002); Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000); Cogley and Sargent (2001, 
2003); Judd and Rudebusch (1998); Nelson (2000); Stock and Watson (2003b); Taylor (1999). Exceptionally, 
Orphanides (2004) argues that US policy makers always raised interest rates aggressively in response to expected 
inflation but overestimated the economy’s spare capacity in the 1970s. But Nelson (2004) argues that expectations 
of inflation were systematically too low in the 1970s, giving rise to a weak interest rate response to actual inflation. 
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Region United  States  Euro  area United  Kingdom  Japan 
inflation  regime  High  Low high low high low high low 
Clarida et al. (1998)  -  1.79  -  1.31*  -  -  -  2.04 
Clarida  et  al.  (2000)  0.83  2.15  - - - - - - 
Gerdesmeier  &  Roffia - - -  1.93  - - - - 
Kamada  &  Muto  - - - - - - -  0.33 
Judd  &  Rudebusch    0.85  1.62**  - - - - - - 
Martin and Rowthorn  0.44  1.54 0.62 1.63 0.37 1.19 0.37 1.09 
Nelson  - - - -  0.34**  1.27  - - 
Taylor  0.81  1.53  - - - - - - 
Source: Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000); Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003); Kamada and Muto (2000); Judd 
and Rudebusch (1998); Martin and Rowthorn (this paper); Nelson (2000); Taylor (1999). * Bundesbank   
** average of two sub-periods. Since estimation methods and sample periods vary considerably, we assign to high 
and low inflation regimes regression coefficients that appear representative of each study. The authors’ estimates 
are based on a simple Taylor Rule specification – see appendix. 
Monetary policy developments may have promoted stability of inflation but the impact on output 
volatility is less clear, as Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) emphasise. Unlike shocks to output, shocks to 
inflation require policy makers to choose between stabilisation of output and the stabilisation of 
inflation. An oil price shock, for example, would tend to raise prices and depress output – and policy 
may aggravate the latter while repressing the former. Over time, a growing preference for stable 
inflation might have been achieved at the expense of greater output volatility.  
 
Shocks and surprises 
A final possibility is that the outbreak of economic stability is just good luck. Many claim that the 
volatility of growth and inflation in the 1970s arose from great misfortune – such as huge oil price 
increases and the coincidental slowdown in trend growth. Conversely, less pronounced shocks over the 
last 20 years are deemed to have contributed to the decline in economic volatility.  
Others, like Taylor (1998), reject this account on the grounds that shocks continued unabated after the 
mid-1980s. Examples include disruptive currency movements; the US savings and loans crisis; large 
oil price changes; Britain’s late-1980s housing boom and bust; the European exchange rate mechanism 
debacle; massive stock market bubbles; Europe’s monetary union. This debate cannot be resolved by 
the citation of lists of events, however. Some measure of the volatility of shocks is required.  
Based on our simple models, Table 12 offers tentative estimates of the standard deviation of output and 
inflation shocks in the high inflation period before 1984 and in the years subsequently. The estimates 
suggest that shocks have indeed become more subdued over the last 20 years. The variability of output 
and inflation shocks has fallen on average by around 35% and 55% respectively, with the largest falls 
occurring in the UK and Japan and the smallest (possibly insignificant) occurring in the Euro area. 
 
Table 12: Shock variability 
%  ---------- output shocks ----------  ---------- inflation shocks ---------- 
inflation regime  high  low  high  low 
United States  1.8  1.2  1.1  0.4 
Euro area  1.2  1.0  0.6  0.4 
United Kingdom  1.9  1.0  4.6  0.9 
Japan 2.4  1.2  3.8  0.7 
G10 1.3  0.9  0.8  0.3 
Source: authors’ calculations  Standard deviations of output and inflation shocks in high (1968-1983) and low 
(1984-2003) inflation periods. G10 shows the standard deviations of the fix-weighted sum of regional shocks. The 
“shocks” are the residuals from output gap and inflation regressions adjusted to include the impact of shock 
dummies in the high inflation period. For each region, output gap residuals are taken from SURE regressions over 
the 1968-2003 period relating the output gap to the lagged output gap, a measure of the lagged real short-term 
interest rate and the lagged change in the budget-deficit-to-GDP ratio – see appendix. 
Accounting for stability 
One way to ascertain the relative importance of the forces that may have contributed to greater 
economic stability is to conduct counterfactual exercises. These exercise involve imagining how 
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would cope with today’s shocks and then examining the differences. 
Many studies have undertaken such comparisons, despite the severe difficulties. The counterfactuals 
rest on the strong assumption that the nature of the economy is separable from the shocks it faces. And 
the results are sensitive to the usual problems of estimating abstract, often highly simplified, economic 
models, made worse in this case by the short period of years from which it is possible to detect changes 
of behaviour. “Shocks” are identified with the residuals from such models – so “bad” models inevitably 
attribute most of the volatility of GDP and inflation to shocks rather than to structure. However, the 
counterfactual method is useful if treated as an accounting exercise in broad orders of magnitude.  
At a general level, our concern is to account for the observed change in economic volatility between 
two periods. One way to proceed involves the running of numerous simulations of a model of an 
economy when it is repeatedly subject to shocks that are, in some sense, characteristic of each period. 
These pretend shocks might be manufactured, for example, by taking samples of shocks from an 
(assumed) probability distribution. Ahmed et al., (2004); Buch et al., (2002) and Stock and Watson 
(2002) use an analytical equivalent of this procedure to examine how economic performance would 
change were economies subject to period-1 type shocks instead of period-2 type shocks.  
An alternative method, deployed, for example, by Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Stock and Watson 
(2003b), uses not pretend shocks drawn from a distribution but rather the “actual” shocks observed in 
each period, a procedure that may well be preferable when sample periods are short. A further 
advantage is that a model simulated with “actual” shocks over the period from which those shocks 
were estimated will exactly replicate the history of the period, as a matter of identity. This feature 
enables a more precise decomposition of the observed change in volatility of growth and inflation. 
Again at a general level, we can identify three reasons why volatility might change between two 
periods. The first concerns the position from which the economy starts – its “initial conditions”. 
Volatility could fall were an economy initially out of balance in the first period but in balance at the 
start of the second period, a consideration given scant attention in previous studies
8. The second 
contributor to changed volatility reflects changes in economic behaviour (for example, of inflation or of 
policy), driving forces that are often referred to collectively as an economy’s “propagation 
mechanism”. The third contribution comes from changes in shocks that perturb the economy. 
These three contributors to changed economic volatility give rise to multiple counterfactuals and 
comparisons, as Table 13 illustrates. Each counterfactual here represents different combinations of the 
(earlier) period 1 and (later) period 2 contributors (initial conditions, economic behaviour or shocks). 
“Counterfactuals” A1 and A5 are special in that they use own-period contributors and therefore exactly 
replicate the history of their respective periods. The observed change in volatility is measured by 
subtracting the variance of A5 from the variance of A1, a difference that can be attributed to multiple 
combinations of the three contributors looking both backwards and forwards in time. 
 
Table 13: Counterfactual volatilities 
Sets  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 
Initial  conditions  2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Economic  behaviour  2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Shocks  2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 
Note: Figures refer to periods 1 and 2 
 
For example, the role of changed behaviour can be investigated by backwards applying period 2’s 
behaviour to period 1’s initial conditions and shocks (counterfactual A7) or by forwards applying 
period 1’s behaviour to period 2’s initial conditions and shocks (counterfactual A3). A7 less A5 gives 
the impact of the change in behaviour holding constant period 1’s initial conditions and shocks while 
A1 less A3 shows the impact of the change in behaviour holding constant the initial conditions and 
shocks of period 2. The differences between counterfactuals A8 and A6 and between A2 and A4 offer 
further alternatives holding constant different mixes of initial conditions and shocks: either period 1 
initial conditions with period 2 shocks or period 2 initial conditions with period 1 shocks.  
                                                 
8 For example, the contribution formulae in Stock and Watson (2003a) ignore initial conditions. 
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possibilities for each contributor. A further complication arises from the fact that the impact of a 
change in economic behaviour (unlike that of the other contributors) interacts with starting conditions 
and shocks, creating an adding-up problem. For example, the sum of A4 less A5, A7 less A5 and A6 
less A5, respectively the impacts in period 1 of changed initial conditions, changed behaviour and 
changed shocks, will in general not equal A1 less A5. In the appendix, we describe formulae that 
exhaust backward-forward comparisons, avoid double counting, apportion interaction effects in a 
symmetric fashion and, by identity, exactly account for the observed change in economic volatility. 
Table 14 presents our estimates of the forces contributing to the change in growth and inflation 
volatility between the periods 1968-1983 and 1988-2003, each period being of an equal length 
determined by the shorter high-inflation period. The results show the attributed decline in the variance 
of growth and inflation expressed as a percentage of the change in variances between the two periods. 
A minus sign indicates a change that produces greater stability. 
The results paint the following broad picture: 
•  As regards the fall in growth variability, changed shocks played the dominant role in the US 
and UK while changed economic behaviour played the dominant role in the Euro area and 
Japan.  
 
•  As regards the fall in inflation variability, changed economic behaviour played the greater role 
in the US and Euro area; changed shocks played the dominant role in the UK and Japan. 
 
Table 14: Stability contributors - summary 
% of change in   Initial   Economic  Shocks &  
variance conditions  Behaviour  surprises 
Growth     
United States  -2  2  -100 
Euro area  12  -91  -21 
United Kingdom  14  -7  -107 
Japan 15  -93  -21 
Inflation     
United States  -6  -58  -36 
Euro area  34  -153  19 
United Kingdom  18  -26  -92 
Japan  -19 -18 -63 
Source: authors’ calculations   Total of contributions is –100%, subject to rounding error. Calculations in terms of 
the output gap show a pattern similar to that given here for growth.  
 
Historical circumstances have a considerable bearing on these results. For example, in the early-1990s, 
the Euro area and Japan were coping with excess demand, the result of German unification and Japan’s 
previous property bubble. By contrast, the US and UK were in recession. In these circumstances, a 
1970s-style regime of low real interest rates – that is, forwards applying period-1 policy behaviour to 
period-2 conditions - would have further disrupted the Euro area and Japan but would have helped 
stabilise activity in the US and UK, albeit with adverse implications for inflation. As a result, the 
change in economic behaviour between high and low inflation periods was beneficial to the Euro area 
and Japan but contributed little to the observed fall in growth volatility in the US and UK, even though 
the behaviour changes in these economies are generally auspicious for stability
9. 
Looking in more detail, one might wish to divide the contribution of behaviour in Table 14 into 
component parts – those attributable in our models to the changed behaviour of inflation, interest rates 
and fiscal policy. But this division can be misleading. Monetary policy aided stability both directly, as 
the response of interest rates changed, and also indirectly, through the effect on inflation’s behaviour. 
                                                 
9 One can contrast this result with the calculation of (asymptotic) variances implied by the analytical procedure of, 
for example, Stock and Watson (2002). US and UK output gap asymptotic variances fell by an infinite amount 
between high and low inflation periods, the consequences of instability in the high inflation era. The instability 
arises from the combination of a very high degree of inflation persistence and the below unit coefficient on 
inflation in the interest rate equation. In technical terms, the US and UK high inflation models have an explosive 
root: the dominant eigen values are 1.02 and 1.07 respectively. This is a nice illustration of the pitfalls of using 
asymptotic variances to make inferences about changed economic performance over short time periods. 
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and arguably understate monetary policy’s role.  
The detailed split given in Table 15 shows that: 
•  The changed behaviour of inflation reduced growth volatility, especially in Japan and in the 
Euro area, and reduced inflation volatility significantly in all regions except Japan (where 
changed shocks played the dominant role). 
•  Changes in interest rate policy reduced growth volatility everywhere, curtailed inflation 
volatility in the Euro area but raised inflation volatility in the US and UK, possibly reflecting a 
policy trade-off between growth and inflation stabilisation.  
•  Changes in budget policy promoted stability in Japan but played a small role elsewhere. 
Adding together the contributions of changed inflation and changed interest rate behaviour, the table 
suggests that monetary policy made a significant contribution not only to the reduction in the level and 
volatility of inflation but also to the reduction in growth volatility. The largest impact is in the Euro 
area where 72% of the reduction in growth volatility is attributed to the general effects of monetary 
policy. In Japan and the UK, our figures for monetary policy’s role are 59% and 15% respectively. The 
smallest effect occurs in the US (7%) though this may well be an understatement; several years of 
Volcker’s reforms are included in the earlier period used in our comparisons. 
 
Table 15: Stability contributors – types of behaviour 
% of   ------------ Contribution arising from changes in the behaviour of ------------ 
change in  Inflation  Interest   Monetary  Budget  All * 
variance rate  Rate  policy  **  policy   
Growth       
US -1 -7 -7 9  2 
Euro  area  -23 -49 -72 -19 -91 
UK -4 -11  -15 8  -7 
Japan  -20 -38 -59 -35 -93 
Inflation        
US -93 26 -67  9  -58 
Euro  area  -89 -57  -147 -6 -153 
UK -56 37 -19 -7 -26 
Japan  -5 -4 -9 -8  -18 
Source: authors’ calculations   * sum of third & fourth columns, equal to “economic behaviour”, Table 14   
** sum of first 2 columns. Totals subject to rounding error 
 
These results can be usefully compared with those in Stock and Watson (2003b) who focus on the 
volatility of output growth in the US and Euro area. They attribute 26% of the post-1984 fall in output 
volatility in the Euro area to improved monetary policy, which they equate solely with changed interest 
rate behaviour. At most, 7% of the reduction in US growth volatility is similarly attributed; indeed, 
they find instances where the shift in U.S. monetary policy increased growth volatility by up to 10%. 
The average of their three estimates suggests that monetary policy raised US growth volatility by 2%. 
These rival estimates are affected by the nature of the counterfactuals considered in the calculations. 
Stock and Watson calculate the impact on growth variance of their pre-1979 interest rate equation 
given the shocks and other attributes of the later period. This restricted comparison leaves out of 
account other valid backward-forward comparisons. For example, the authors do not ask by how much 
period 1’s growth variance might have been reduced by the improved monetary policy of period 2 or 
what the effect would have been with different characterisations of inflation propagation. 
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%  --------------- Shocks ---------------  ---------- Interest rate policy ---------- 
Calculation method  This study  Stock and Watson  This study  Stock and Watson 
United States  -100  -101  -7  -7 
Euro  area  -21 -21 -49 -25 
United Kingdom  -107  -101  -11  5 
Japan  -21 -28 -38 -10 
Source: Stock and Watson (2003b); authors’ calculations. Calculation method: This study – as described in text; 
Stock and Watson – as in Stock and Watson (2003b) but using our simulation results. The equivalent figures (with 
appropriate sign convention) in Stock and Watson (2003b) are for US growth: between -82% and -140% (shocks) 
and between -7% and +10% (interest rate policy); for Euro area growth: -26% (interest rate policy) 
To assess the impact of methodology, Table 16 compares the effect of applying Stock and Watson’s 
method to our simulation results with our estimates based on our more exhaustive assessment of 
counterfactuals. The table shows that methodology does not materially affect the assessment of the role 
played by shocks but does affect the assessment of interest rate policy. Emulating Stock and Watson’s 
method, our simulations produce estimates for the impact of interest rate policy in the US and Euro 
area that are close to theirs. But in every case except the US, our exhaustive method produces estimates 
of the role played by interest rate policy that are greater than implied by the Stock and Watson method. 
Adding in the impact of changed inflation behaviour further increases the divergence between the two 
approaches, as Figure 1 illustrates.  
 







US Euro area UK Japan
Monetary policy (our method)
Interest rate policy (our method)
Interest rate policy (S&W method)
 
 
The role of shocks 
Despite the importance of policy seen in these results, the counterfactual exercises still identify shocks 
as a key source of lower growth variability in the US and UK and of lower inflation variability in the 
UK and Japan. We need to dig deeper. 
As a first step, it is useful to know whether the reduction in volatility arose from direct shocks either to 
output or inflation or indirectly from other types of shock. For example, a reduction in inflation 
variability might arise from changes in output shocks rather than from shocks directly affecting 
  14inflation. We distinguish between four types of direct shock: to output, to inflation, to short-term 
interest rates and to the budget-deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
As Table 17 records for cases where shocks are key, the results are straightforward. The reduction in 
growth volatility in the US and UK is mainly attributable to changes in direct shocks to output. The 
reduction in inflation volatility in the UK and Japan is mainly attributable to changes in direct shocks to 
inflation, though in Japan output shocks were also quite important. Some would draw the implication 
that instability could easily return with another bout of misfortune that caused large output and inflation 
shocks. But this would be a non sequitur. What is required is a theory to explain the shocks. 
 
Table 17: Stability contributors – types of shock 
% of change in   --------------- Contribution of shocks directly affecting: --------------- 
variance Output  Inflation  Interest  Budget    All* 
   rate  rate  deficit   
Growth       
United  States -85  -3 -7 -5  -100 
United Kingdom  -89  9  -5  -22  -107 
Inflation       
United Kingdom  -9  -79  -3  0  -92 
Japan -24  -39  -2  1  -63 
Source: authors’ calculations   * as in final column, Table 14, subject to rounding error. Budget deficit shocks 
derived from SURE regressions relating the budget-deficit-to-GDP ratio to the output gap and to the lagged ratio 
with allowance for intercept and slope shifts and shock dummies – see appendix. As in other tables, shocks are 
adjusted to include the effect of shock dummy variables.  
This is easier said than done. Shocks are, by definition, the things that the economic model in question 
does not explain. In their investigations, Stock and Watson (2002) found that identifiable shocks 
accounted for rather little of the observed decline in the variability of US growth. Oil price shocks 
made “a negligible contribution” or, on some measures, went the “wrong way”; productivity and 
commodity price shocks made a modest contribution “in the neighbourhood of 15%”. Much the greater 
part of the decline in US volatility was due to unknown shocks. Other possibilities need consideration. 
Ormerod (2002) suggests intriguingly that the long secular decline in US growth volatility might be 
due to a reduction in industrial concentration. If shocks to GDP are considered as a summation of 
shocks hitting individual enterprises, and the shocks are not highly correlated, the greater the number of 
enterprises, the smaller would be the variability of shocks to GDP. But whatever its merits as an 
explanation of the secular decline in US growth volatility, it seems unlikely that changes in industrial 
concentration can explain the fall in the variability of shocks since the 1970s and early-1980s. Limited 
and somewhat dated estimates of industrial concentration show that it has increased in US, UK and 
German manufacturing since the late-1960s (van Ark and Monnikhof (1996)). 
The most obvious cause of the changed volatility of shocks is inflation. During the 1970s, expectations 
of inflation were probably highly volatile, subject to what the late Oxford economist John Flemming 
called “changes of gear” (Flemming (1976)). Rapid changes in inflation expectations would have 
added to the volatility of inflation itself. And jumps in inflation may well have caused real disruption, 
affecting households’ and businesses’ liquidity, cash flow and confidence. As Bernanke (2004) notes, 
such events would be registered as “shocks” in standard economic models. It is certainly the case that 
mainstream econometric models of the macro-economy generally broke down in the 1970s. 
A counterargument would point to the importance of massive oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979. But the 
pricing decisions taken by OPEC, the oil producers’ cartel, were partly dependent on their perceptions 
of oil importers’ economic policies. Policies in the West that were perceived to accommodate inflation 
might well have encouraged a more aggressive OPEC stance. Barsky and Kilian (2001) argue 
convincingly that the oil price shocks were caused, in part, by excessive monetary expansion.  
Such considerations help to explain the well-documented tendency for the variability of inflation to rise 
and fall with its level. Not surprisingly, we also find that the variability of shocks to inflation is geared 
to the average inflation rate. According to a simple regression that pools information on the four 
regions used in this study, a 1-percentage point increase in the rate of inflation has been associated with 
an increase of a third in the standard deviation of inflation shocks, an estimate not unlike one used by 
Bean (1998) in his account of UK inflation. 
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the average inflation rate but only episodically related to oil prices. Historically, a 1-percentage point 
change in the inflation rate has been associated with a change of about a tenth in the standard deviation 
of output shocks (see the appendix for details). Although only suggestive, these results are comparable 
to those offered by Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) and Blanchard and Simon (2001) who find a 
relationship between the variability of growth and of inflation
10. The simulations of Orphanides and 
Williams (2004) also provide supporting evidence. They find that the rise in US inflation and in 
inflation persistence in the 1970s, the result of monetary policy errors and changes of gear in the 
formation of inflation expectations, raised the volatility of both inflation and unemployment. 
Taking our coefficient, Table 18 considers the possible contribution of the fall in inflation to the change 
in the volatility of output shocks between the turbulent decade to 1983 and the benign decade ending in 
2003. For the US and UK, the calculations suggest that the decline in inflation accounts for all the fall 
in output shock variability. In Japan, the comparable figure is over 70%. In the Euro area, the fall in 
output shock volatility is much less than would be expected as a result of inflation’s fall, suggesting 
that other developments (monetary union?) may have been a source of countervailing disturbance. 
 
Table 18: Accounting for output shock variability 
Output shock  Change 1974-1983   Inflation contribution 
standard deviation   to 1994-2003  % of variance change 
United States  -0.5  -99 
Euro area  -0.3  -240 
United Kingdom  -1.1  -101 
Japan -0.8  -72 
Source: authors’ calculations    “Output” refers to the output gap 
 
These findings add weight to the view that the 1970s period was anomalous and a creation of unstable 
and high inflation. If so, there are two important implications.  
First, the counterfactual exercises, while useful as a first pass, are likely to overstate the role played by 
shocks and understate the role played by monetary policy. The defeat of inflation appears to have 
reduced the inflation shocks that predominantly account for the decline in inflation volatility in the UK 
and Japan. In addition, lower inflation may well have fostered smaller output shocks that account for 
most of the decline in US and UK growth volatility. 
The second implication concerns the future. If policy makers continue to target low inflation, and do so 
credibly, there is probably much less reason to fear a return of 1970s style output and inflation shocks.  
 
Volatility scenarios 
On this basis, we construct a base case scenario of economic volatility over the next decade using the 
experience of the last 20 years as a guide. The range of shocks during this period is probably wide and 
varied enough to represent the uncertainties of a future that today is at risk from global imbalances. 
To build the scenario, we pepper our low-inflation-era depiction of economies with 150 sets of pretend 
shocks to output, inflation, interest rates and the budget deficit. On average, these shocks have the same 
characteristics as those of the last two decades – the same volatility and the same correlation, both 
within and across regions. Based on our earlier review, the process of globalisation is assumed not 
materially to affect these inter-relationships. We calculate the volatility of growth and inflation of the 
major economies separately and treating them as a single (G10) economy. The final result, an average 
of the 150 simulations, is also affected by current and assumed long-run economic conditions
11. 
                                                 
10 Barrel and Gottschalk (2004) also emphasise the stabilising role of greater openness to trade and finance, though 
many studies find either contrary results or no stable relationship with openness (see, for example, Buch, Döpke 
and Pierdzioch (2002a); Karras and Song (1996); Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003); Razin and Rose (1994)). 
 
11 Intercept adjustments are made to produce results that on average accord with consensus forecasts for 2004 and 
consensus long-run projections for growth, inflation and budget deficits.  
  16Table 19: Past and projected volatility – base case 
%  1954-1973 1994-2003 2004-2013 
Growth     
United  States  2.5 1.2 1.8 
Euro  area  1.1 0.9 1.2 
UK  1.8 0.8 1.4 
Japan  2.4 1.5 1.5 
G10  1.4 0.8 1.1 
Inflation     
United  States  1.6 0.4 0.6 
Euro  area  1.7 0.6 0.6 
UK  2.4 0.7 1.1 
Japan  2.7 0.9 1.0 
G10  1.5 0.3 0.5 
Source: authors’ calculations   Standard deviations of real GDP growth and inflation 
 
Table 19 reports the projected volatilities in the demanding context of previous periods of relative 
tranquillity: the two decades of the “Golden Age” up to 1973 and the “nice” decade ending in 2003.  
Compared with the last decade, the projections show: 
•  a modest (though not statistically significant) increase in growth volatility in the US, Euro 
area and UK, with no change in Japan
12;  
•  small increases in the volatility of inflation in the US and UK and little or no change in the 
Euro area or Japan.  
These projections support King’s (2003) contention that the last decade was an exceptional period, 
unlikely to be repeated. But in a wider context, the results show most economies enjoying an unusual 
degree of macroeconomic stability, at least equal to that experienced in the post-war Golden Age of the 
1950s and 1960s. Prospective G10 growth and inflation volatility is lower. 
As before, any reading of volatility has to take into account the economy’s trend rate of growth. At first 
sight, Table 19 suggests that the Euro area would remain the most stable of the major economic 
regions. But this would amount to stability around a relatively low trend rate of growth. Conversely, 
the higher growth volatility in the US occurs against a background of a faster trend rate of growth.  
A more revealing comparison, and one that better reflects changes in economic welfare (see, Galί, 
Gertler and Lόpez-Salido (2003)), comes from an examination of the likelihood of severe recession – 
defined, as in Table 4, as a zero change or fall in annual GDP. Since projected volatility is largely 
insensitive to changes in trend growth, the chance of severe recession rises if trend growth falls.  
Table 20 shows the frequency of severe recession granted our base case assumptions for trend growth. 
Broadly in line with consensus thinking, these envisage annual trend growth of 3.2% in the US, 2% in 
the Euro area, 2.5% in the UK and 1.5% in Japan. Actual average rates of growth depend on the shocks 
and any catch-up from the early-2000s recession. Growth in Japan, for example, averages 1.7% a year 
over the next decade. To test sensitivities, the table also reports the impact of assuming trend growth 
rates that are uniformly 0.5 percentage points lower than in the base case.  
 
Table 20: Severe recession probabilities 
%  Past  --------------------------- Projection --------------------------- 
  1954-1973  base case  lower trend growth 
United States  10  2.9  5.3 
Euro area  0  3.8  8.2 
UK 0  4.2  8.1 
Japan 0  13.2  21.5 
G10 0  0.7  2.4 
Source: authors’ calculations  Frequency of occurrence of zero or negative GDP growth in any year.  
Projections based on 150 replications 
                                                 
12 Significance is judged on the basis of (wide) standard errors over the next decade. Output gap variability 
follows a similar pattern to that of growth except in the US case where projected variability shows no rise. 
  17The results show that US severe recession risk over the next decade is rather lower, albeit 
insignificantly so, than that in the Euro area or the UK, notwithstanding the higher volatility of US 
growth. Compared with the Golden Age, US severe recession risk falls, even on weak trend growth 
assumptions. Prospective severe recession risk in Europe is a little higher than in the Golden Age. 
With low trend growth but middling growth volatility, Japan is the most exposed to severe recession 
risk. The projections imply that Japan could expect to experience zero growth or a fall in GDP in 1 or 2 
years over the next decade. The prospective risk is substantially higher than in Japan’s Golden Age.  
Despite Japan’s problems, diversified regional experience means that the risk of severe recession in the 
G10 is less than 1% on base case trend growth assumptions and still less than 3% with lower trend 
growth, risks not substantially different from Golden Age experience. 
Another aspect of stability is represented by the risk of encountering the lower bound – typically taken 
to be zero - for nominal short-term interest rates. If interest rates cannot fall below zero (as assumed in 
our simulations), output could become permanently and increasingly depressed in circumstances of 
severe price deflation that raised the real rate of interest.  
The probabilities reported in Table 21, conditioned by current circumstances, are in line with other 
research findings for economies outside Japan (see, for example, the review in Yates (2002)). In the US 
and Europe, the likelihood of encountering the zero bound in the next decade is put in the range of 1%-
10% granted normal nominal interest rates of between 2.5% and 4.7%. In our models, the normal 
interest rate is governed by the prospects for trend growth and average inflation. In Japan, where our 
base case presumes a normal nominal interest rate of only 1.5%, the probability of being at the zero 
bound is in excess of 30%. Were the normal nominal interest rate just 0.5%, the Japanese economy 
would be at the lower bound over half the time. 
Table 21: Zero bound probability in next decade 
%  Base case  Lower normal interest rate* 
United States  2.3  2.9 
Euro area  3.5  9.9 
UK 1.0  2.9 
Japan 32.1  55.1 
Source: authors’ calculations Frequency of occurrence of zero nominal interest rates in any year based on 150 
replications. Base case steady-state nominal interest rates are: 4.7% (US), 3.5% (Euro area); 4.5% (UK); 1.5% 
(Japan). * 1 percentage point lower than in base case 
 
Alternative scenarios 
In general, the base case paints a fairly benign picture. It points to the continuation of historically low 
inflation volatility (albeit rising in the UK) and limited chance of severe recession outside Japan. 
Growth volatility rises in the US and UK but not to “turbulent” levels. We now consider the sensitivity 
of these results to alternate assumptions about policy rules and shock assumptions. 
Tables 22 and 23 entertain three alternatives. First, given base case assumption about shocks, we 
envisage how outcomes might be affected by possible improvements in the conduct of monetary and 
fiscal policy. Although artificial, the amended policy rules may be taken to represent a shift towards 
more active demand management made possible in a low inflation environment
13.  
The second and third alternative scenarios envisage different distributions of shocks and surprises. The 
first variant (“Shock90”) uses only the last decade as a basis for the estimation of the distribution of 
shocks; the second variant (“Shock70”) uses the experience of the turbulent 1970s and early-1980s.  
The results for the “policy” scenario show only a very modest improvement on the base case, 
suggesting limited room for further macroeconomic policy gains if our simple models are any guide. 
The more significant changes arise from the different assumptions about shocks. The “Shock90” 
variant has little impact on economies except the UK. Lower volatility of shocks to UK output and 
inflation leads to greater stability and reduced risk of severe recession.  
                                                 
13 In particular, we raise the coefficients on the output gap in the interest rate and budget deficit equations, a 
procedure that takes no account of the difficulty of real-time output gap estimation – see appendix for details.  
  18This finding also helps corroborate King’s (2003) contention that the past decade has been unusually 
benign, though our results point to the exceptionally low variance of UK shocks rather than to an effect 
arising, as King argues, from the time pattern of shocks. 
 
 
Table 22: Alternative volatility scenarios 
Standard deviation,   ----------------------------- Scenarios ------------------------------ 
2004-2013, %  base case  policy  shock90  shock70 
Growth      
United  States  1.8 1.7 1.7 2.4 
Euro  area  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 
United  Kingdom  1.4 1.3 1.1 2.5 
Japan  1.5 1.4 1.6 2.9 
G10  1.1 1.1 1.0 1.5 
Inflation      
United  States  0.6 0.5 0.4 1.2 
Euro  area  0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 
United  Kingdom  1.1 1.1 0.8 4.8 
Japan  1.0 0.9 0.9 4.1 
G10  0.5 0.4 0.3 0.9 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 23: Severe recession risk – alternative scenarios 
%  ----------------------------- Scenarios ------------------------------ 
 base  case  policy  shock90  shock70 
United States  2.9  2.4  2.4  7.9 
Euro area  3.8  3.1  3.7  6.7 
United Kingdom  4.2  2.9  0.9  16.6 
Japan 13.2  9.7  13.9  29.5 
G10 0.7  0.7  0.6  5.4 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
A return to 1970s style shocks would disturb all the major regions and materially increase severe 
recession risk. In such circumstances, prospective output and inflation volatilities would be generally 
lower than during the Great Inflation, thanks to better policy and lower inflation persistence. But this 
would be cold comfort. Compared with the last decade, output and inflation volatilities would be much 
higher in all regions except perhaps the Euro area, where shock variance increases least. 
 
Conclusions  
In drawing conclusions, it is worth stressing the simplicity of our models and approach. Further 
research could usefully test for robustness over alternative model specifications (see, for example, 
Stock and Watson (2003b)) and over alternative - non-normal - shock distribution assumptions. In 
particular, we would not seek to draw conclusions about policy optimisation from the current study; 
our assessment of the impact of alternative policy rules should be seen as no more than a simple 
sensitivity analysis of our baseline projections. 
Will stability last? Our analysis suggests that the major economies, Japan excepted, could continue to 
enjoy an unusual degree of macroeconomic stability judged by post-war standards granted two 
conditions: first, the survival of the new monetary standard that credibly delivers low inflation and, 
second, the presence of shocks that are no more extreme than those seen over the last two decades.  
Larger shocks are clearly possible, but we would argue that the varied and often unsettling events of 
this 20-year period are not an implausible basis for assessing the medium-term future (Martin (2004)). 
Although the next decade may not prove to be as “nice” as the last one, granted average luck and 
current institutions, a “not bad” outcome seems to us to be within the bounds of probability. 
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  24Appendix 
Inflation behaviour and policy preferences in a model of economic volatility 
The following model illustrates the impact on the volatility of output and inflation of changes in 
economic structure and in policy preferences. Following Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000); Ball 
(1999); Bean (1998) and Svensson (1997), we consider an economy in which demand and inflation are 
described by the equations: 
η λ µ + + = − 1 - 1 y - y r      (1) 
ε α π ω π + + = − ) y ( 1 - 1      (2) 
where:  is the output gap;  y r is the real interest rate; π is the inflation rate and η and ε are zero mean, 
independent white-noise disturbances with respective variances  . 
2 2   , ε η σ σ
Equation (2) represents the aggregate outcome of decisions taken by two sets of firms, “A” and “B”, 
with relative weights ω and (1-ω) respectively. “A” firms are “accelerationist” in their price setting: 
1- 1 y
AA A π πα ε − =+ +      (3) 
while “B” firms are “flat-liners”: 
B B ε π π + =
*       ( 4 )  
where   is a constant equal to the central bank’s inflation target. Apart from their pricing decisions, 
the firms are identical so that   and  . For simplicity, we assume that  . 
* π
yy
AB == y ε ε ε = =
B A 0
* = π
The model has a recursive structure in which the interest rate affects output and output affects inflation 
each with a one period (“year”) delay. Forced to take next year’s inflation as given, the central bank 
must seek to affect inflation in two years time by setting the current real interest rate to alter next year’s 
expected level of the output gap,  .  1 Ey+
The central bank’s behaviour implies: 
1 1 E Ey + + − = π ρ       ( 5 )  
ρ being a positive parameter related to the authorities’ trade-off between output and inflation volatilty.  
Since expected inflation in two year’s time is given by: 
) Ey E ( E 1 1 2 + + + + = α π ω π      (6) 
it follows from the central bank’s behaviour that: 





= , then  0 E 2 = + π . In this case, the central bank pursues a pure (zero) inflation target. A case 
where 
α
ρ 0 < <
1
 corresponds to a generalised policy rule in which the inflation target is approached 
more gradually by a central bank that also has regard to the cost of output volatility.  
The implied Taylor-like rule for the real interest rate can be derived by noting from equation (1) that: 
y Ey 1 λ µ + − = + r       ( 8 )  
and from equation (2):  
y) ( E 1 α π ω π + = +      (9) 
Next year’s expected output gap and inflation are linked through the central bank’s behaviour 
described by equation (5). Substitution of equations (8) and (9) into (5) gives the following expression 
for the real interest rate: 





=      ( 1 0 )  
After substituting equation (10) into equation (1), the economy can be described in matrix notation: 
F BX X 1 - + =       ( 1 1 )  
 






























Using the standard result that: 
() [] [ ] () [] F Var Vec B B - I X Var Vec
1 − ⊗ =  
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, it follows, assuming zero correlation between the demand and 































+    (13) 
The model has several noteworthy features: 
•  Granted that monetary policy affects inflation only by affecting demand, it follows that 
developments in output and inflation are independent of the parameters describing the 
aggregate demand relationship: µ and λ . These parameters influence the interest rate rule. 
•  The volatility of output and inflation and their co-movement are determined solely by the 
characteristics of the supply curve (equation (2)) and by policy preferences (equation (5)). 
 
The impact of a fall in inflation persistence combined with a flattening of the short-run Phillips curve, 
features of the empirical evidence, can be found by differentiating equations (12) and (13) with respect 
to ω and reversing the sign. 
 
The effect on the variance of the output gap is given by: 
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and on the variance of inflation by: 
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- in both cases negative. This result could be taken as indicative of the impact of a more credible (zero) 
inflation target that reduces the positive feedback embedded in the system of equations (1) and (2) by 
increasing the preponderance of flat-liner-pricing firms. 
  26The impact of more inflation-averse policy preferences can be found by differentiating equations (12) 
and (13) with respect to ρ. The effect on the variance of the output gap is given by: 
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and on the variance of inflation by: 
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The impact of a change in the slope of the short-run Phillips curve can be examined by differentiating 
equations (12) and (13) with respect to α. The effect on the variance of the output gap is given by: 
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Although the variances of output and inflation move in the same direction, the impact of changes in 
inflation’s sensitivity to output is generally ambiguous. Only in the case where the central bank pursues 




= , are expressions (18) and (19) unambiguously positive. In this case, a 
flatter Phillips curve would lead to falls in output and inflation variances that depend on the supply 
curve and the scale of demand shocks.  
With less extreme policy preferences, however, the direction of impact is ambiguous, the result 
depending on the relative importance of supply and demand shocks. If supply shocks predominate, 
output and inflation variances could increase as inflation’s sensitivity to output falls.  
Table A1 summarises the impact of model parameter shifts on macroeconomic stability. Since all these 
parameters may have changed over time and have offsetting effects, the net impact is unclear. It should 
be stressed that the model’s results refer to asymptotic variances, which are unlikely to be a foolproof 
guide to developments over limited historical time spans.  
 
Table A1: Theoretical impact of regime changes 
Nature of change  -------------------- volatility of -------------------- 
 output  Inflation 
More credible inflation target  down  Down 
Increase in policy-makers’ inflation aversion  up  Down 
Fall in inflation’s output sensitivity  ?  ? 
Source: authors’ analysis 
  27Accounting for volatility 
Our decomposition of variance differences is based on the counterfactuals described in Table 13 in the 
main text. To make explicit the nature of this decomposition, first consider the autoregressive scheme: 
t t t e CZ Z + = −1  
where Zt and the residuals et are vectors and C is a coefficient matrix that defines economic behaviour - 
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Suppose that the initial vector  0 Z  is modified by an amount ∆Z0, the shock vector by amounts ∆ej  and 
the coefficient matrix C by an amount ∆C.  
Define for the counterfactual sets in Table 13 the following new values of t Z : 
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These can be written in the form: 
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The terms It St and Pt are the changes in  t Z  that arise when initial conditions, shocks and the 
propagation mechanism are modified in isolation from each other. The terms ut, vt, wt consist of cross-
products of powers of ∆C with ∆Z0 or ∆ej. Such interaction terms arise when modifications to the 
propagation mechanism are combined with modifications to the initial conditions or shocks. In this 
case, the full effect is not a simple sum of parts. Note that there are no interaction terms involving 
cross-products between ∆Z0 and ∆ej. Thus modifications to initial conditions and shocks are additive. 
For each of the counterfactual sets, A1 to A8, define corresponding variances, V1 to V8: 
Set A1:  1( )
ISP
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The total change in the observed variance, V1-V5, can be decomposed as follows:  
Initial conditions contribution:  
[] 3 / ) 8 1 ( ) 6 3 ( ) 7 2 ( 5 . 0 ) 5 4 ( V V V V V V V V − + − + − + −  =  ()
1
3 () 2 (, ) (,) (, ) 2 ar I Cov I Z Cov I S Cov I P V φ θς ++ + + + −  
Shocks contribution:  
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Economic behaviour (propagation mechanism) contribution:  
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Each of the contributions falls into two main parts: the first four terms that comprise a linear variance-
covariance decomposition and a fifth term that splits the non-linear impact of changes in the 
propagation mechanism. It may be noted that in a linear case where this final term is zero 
(u ), the contribution formulae can be expressed more simply as follows:  0 = = = t t t w v
Initial conditions contribution: 
[ ] (4 5 )(1 8 ) / 2 VV VV −+−  
Shocks contribution: 
[ ] (6 5 )(1 2 ) / 2 VV VV −+−  
Economic behaviour (propagation mechanism) contribution: 
[ ] (7 5 )(1 3 ) / 2 VV VV −+−  
Our procedure can easily be extended to decompose the change in volatility within each class of 
contributor. Details are available on request. 
  29Four-region regressions 
We consider a simple representation of each region (ignoring any intercepts):  
t t-1 1 t-1 t 1 t-1 2 t-1 y,t y( ) y ( - - ) A L i g b e dummies α πα − =− + ∇ + +     output  gap 
dummies e L B t + + + = , 1 - t 3 1 - t t y ) ( π α π π       i n f l a t i o n  
dummies e L E L D i L C i t i t + + + + = − , t t 1 t y ) ( ) ( ) ( π      nominal  interest  rate 
dummies e L G b L F b t b + + − = , t 1 - t t y ) ( ) (       b u d g e t   d e f i c i t  
where: y is the output gap; π is inflation; i is the nominal (three-month) interest rate; g is the trend rate 
of growth; b is the ratio to GDP of the general government financial deficit; A(L)-G(L) are lag 
polynomials,  1  to  3 α α are positive coefficients; e are disturbances;  , to  yt bt e , ∇  is the one-year change.  
Apart from the inclusion of a fiscal policy variable, the equations define a fairly standard backward-
looking model of the type much used in policy-rule assessment (see, for example, Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999)). Although lacking explicit open economy features, the model parameters and shocks 
can be broadly interpreted to reflect the effects of the exchange rate and of foreign output and prices 
(see, for example, Nelson and Nikolov (2002)). The results in Coenen and Wieland (2002) also suggest 
that the simulation properties of explicit open-economy models may not differ greatly from those of 
closed-economy models at this high level of abstraction. 
Parameter constancy is assumed in the case of the output gap equation but the parameters of the 
inflation and policy equations are allowed to change between the high-inflation period (1968-1983) and 
the low-inflation period (1984-2003). Save for the nominal interest rate equation, each equation type is 
treated as a seemingly unrelated regression equation model across the four regions. In all regressions, 
coefficients are generally well determined, correctly signed and of a size that accords with existing 
evidence. The regressions fit acceptably and pass standard tests, albeit with limited degrees of freedom 
and after allowance for shock dummies of the 0, 1 or 1,-1 kind. The shocks in our simulations comprise 
the regressions’ residuals and the impact of shock dummies. Table 10 in the main text summarises the 
characteristics of the inflation equations; other equation coefficients are provided in the following 
tables. Further details are available on request. 
 
Table A2: Output gap equation coefficients 
  ---------- output gap ----------  real interest rate  budget deficit change* 
lag in years  1  2  1  1 
United States  0.90  -0.53  -0.21  0.28 
Euro area  1.10  -0.42  -0.16  0.28 
United Kingdom  1.35  -0.73  -0.12  0.28 
Japan 1.40  -0.64  -0.19  0.28 
Source: authors’ calculations. SURE estimates, 1968 to 2003. Shock dummies in 1972 (Japan), 1974 (US, UK, 
Japan) and 1980 (UK).  * estimated with equality restriction (Wald statistic 0.6) 
 
Table A3: Short-term nominal interest rate equation coefficients 
  interest rate  -------- inflation rate --------  -------- output gap -------- 
lag  in  years  1 0  1 0  1 
High inflation         
United States  -  0.44  -  -  0.37 
Euro  area  - 0.62  - 0.66  - 
United Kingdom  -  0.21  0.16  0.73  - 
Japan -  0.37  -  -  0.22 
Low inflation        
United States  0.34  1.01  -  0.74  -0.54 
Euro area  -  0.74  0.89  0.53  - 
United Kingdom  -  0.55  0.64  0.44  - 
Japan -  0.47  0.62  0.13  - 
Source: authors’ calculations, OLS estimates, pass Wu-Hausman test. Japan low-inflation regression estimated 
1984-2000. High-inflation regressions include a “Volcker” dummy; low-inflation regressions include intercept 
shifts. Shock dummies in US (1992, 2002/03); Euro area (1972/73, 2002/03); Japan (1972/73, 1975). 
  30Table A4: Budget deficit ratio equation coefficients 
  change in output gap  output gap  budget deficit 
lag in years  0  0  1 
High inflation       
United States  -  -0.51  - 
Euro area  -0.84  -0.51  - 
United Kingdom  -0.14  -  - 
Japan -  -0.11  0.73 
Low inflation      
United States  -  -0.30  0.55 
Euro area  -  -0.12  0.53 
United Kingdom  -  -0.48  0.52 
Japan -  -0.18  0.59 
Source: authors’ calculations, SURE estimates, pass Wu-Hausman test. Regressions include intercept shifts. Shock 
dummies in US (2002/03); UK (1968, 1970, 1972, 1975/76, 1984/85, 1998/2000); Japan (1977, 1983) 
 
In the stochastic projections, we consider amended policy rules as shown in Table A5. 
 
Table A5: Amended policy rules 
  ------ inflation rate ------  ------ output gap ------  budget deficit 
lag  in  years  0  1  0 1 1 
interest rate rule (all)  0.5  1.0  1.5  -1  0 
budget deficit rule:           
US, Euro area  0  0  -0.5  0.5  0.5 
UK, Japan  0  0  -1.0  1.0  0.5 
Source: authors’ analysis 
 
 
Panel regressions of output shock variability 
Table A6 reports simple panel regressions that relate the 5-year and 10-year (non-overlapping) trailing 
variance of output gap shocks to the variance of inflation shocks, the average inflation rate, the 
variance and level of real oil prices and a fixed effect for each country. Our preference for the use of 
non-overlapping periods severely reduces degrees of freedom in the 10-year period regressions, which 
are based on only 12 observations. The 5-year period regressions use 28 observations.  
The results suggest that oil prices were not a predominant source of output shock variability. In the 5-
year trailing variance regressions, the variance and level of real oil prices are individually and jointly 
(F =0.2) insignificant. However, the sample is affected by the extreme events in Japan in the mid-1970s 
that were evidently related to the oil price shock. A dummy variable returns a coefficient of 4.1. 
Excluding oil price terms but retaining the 1970s Japanese dummy variable, regression (2) produces 
coefficients on inflation shock variance and on the inflation average that are of the expected sign, 
though neither is statistically significant. Significance is affected by the high collinearity of these 
variables, however. The results suggest the inflation variance regressor may be dropped while retaining 
the term in the inflation average. According to regression (3), two-thirds of the variation over time and 
economy in the 5-year trailing output gap shock variance can be explained by inflation.  
A repeat of the same regression but with 10-year trailing variances (and very limited degrees of 
freedom) produces an almost identical and statistically significant coefficient (regression (4)). Using 
the standard deviation instead of the variance of output gap shocks as the dependent variable gives a 
coefficient on average inflation of 0.09 (t-statistic of 6.0).  
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Table A6: Output shock variance panel regressions 1969-2003, US, Euro area, UK and Japan 
    Dependent variable:  -------------------- Regressors --------------------  Regression statistics 
Trailing  Eq.  variance of output  variance of inflation   ---- real oil price ------  R-bar  Standard 
measure no.  gap shocks  inf. shocks average  variance  average  squared  error 
5-year 1 Coeff 0.03  0.21  -0.00  -0.01  0.66  1.1 
   t-value 1.2  2.0  -0.1  -0.4     
            
 2  coeff 0.04  0.19  -  -  0.69  1.1 
   t-value 1.3  2.0         
            
 3  coeff -  0.29  -  -  0.68  1.1 
    t-value   4.3         
10-year            
 4  coeff -  0.27  -  -  0.75  0.6 
    t-value   5.5         
Source: authors’ calculations Regressions use non-overlapping periods of 5-year (1969-2003) and 10-year (1974-
2003) trailing variances of real oil prices and of shocks to output gaps and inflation. Inflation and real oil price 
means are calculated over the same periods. Regression sets include country fixed effect dummies. 5-year 
regressions use a zero-one dummy that excludes observations on Japan in the 1974 to 1978 period. 
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